Kirk Fitzhugh (e.g., Fitzhugh, 1998) argued that synapomorphy cannot constitute disconfirming evidence of synapomorphy and tested with character congruence, homology and homoplasy are treated as a complement competing cladograms, because synapomorphy is the effect a cladogram is intended to explain. In other relation, a and not-a, respectively. This leaves homoplasy to be defined nominally, something like operational words, synapomorphy as evidence does not meet the scientific standard of independence, and therein, ac-"error" in the inference of homology. In choosing the most severely tested and least disconfirmed cladogram, cording to Fitzhugh, lies a fallacy. Fitzhugh's conjecture of non-independence may be considered a particularly those errors are minimized, and the power of that cladogram to explain synapomorphies, as inherited from the serious challenge to phylogenetic systematics, because it denies that the most severely tested and least disconsame common ancestral condition, is correspondingly maximized. Tests of predictions of homoplasy can lead firmed cladogram can also maximize explanatory power (sensu Farris, 1983). According to Fitzhugh, it to the elimination of those kinds of error. The complementary relationship between homology and homoplasy would be circular to propose that. In an attempt to better understand the issues, pro and con, I briefly is considered one of reciprocal clarification, not epistemological dependence. ᭧
INTRODUCTION
dence between cladogram and synapomorphy is couched in terms of Popperianism. The question prompting this discussion of homology and homoplasy is whether synapomorphy can be ex-
DESCRIPTIVE GENERALIZATIONS
plained deductively and be a test of sister-group relationships.
2 At recent Willi Hennig Society meetings, Descriptive generalizations demand an explanation, and generalizations and explanations are of two basic "I suggest that to give a causal explanation of a certain specific kinds-what I will call universal and historical. Identievent means deducing a statement describing this event from fying the kind of descriptive generalization at hand two kinds of premises: from some universal laws, and from some depends on the general theory (e.g., law) that can be singular or specific statements which we may call the specific rationally justified as an explanation (Hull, 1974) . Coninitial conditions." sider the following generalizations: (a) All atoms with These premises are labeled L and C, respectively, along an atomic number 79 are gold. (b) All swans are white.
with E denoting the event, or effect, in a deductive Atomic theory provides a universal type of explanation model of explanation. Explanation is achieved by deof the former descriptive generalization, whereas Darducing effect from cause, in light of a law or some winian theory provides an historical type of explanageneral theory. 4 Summarizing, tion of the latter.
3 Why? Atomic theory is concerned with spatio-temporally unrestricted generalizations, L, explaining law(s) the particular instances of which are historically inde-C, specific initial condition(s) (cause) pendent, their identity being a matter of intentional explanation definition (Frost and Kluge, 1994) . Darwinian theory, E, specific event (effect). on the other hand, pertains to spatio-temporally restricted things, such as organisms and species, which are connected by descent, and are therefore necessarily unique. Swans may then be understood as constituting
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
a clade, which is defined extensionally in terms of feather color-the observed white feature having been
The general explanatory theory most commonly ap-"inherited" from a common ancestral white swan.
pealed to in phylogenetic systematics was framed by A universal explanation has long been thought of as Darwin (1859). Darwin's theory can be summarized a causal explanation, in so far as it is "an explanation of in terms of three inclusive evolutionary principles: (i) an explanation" (Mill, 1862: 510 question, Popper (1957: 106-107; 1972; 1980) I conclude from this quote, in addition to wholeheart-L, descent, with modification edly endorsing neo-Darwinism, that Popper explained C, cladogram the historical descriptive generalization of certain explanation of independent origins shared similarities (synapomorphies) among terminal E, synapomorphy as homoplasy. taxa in terms of inheritance (common ancestry), in light of the evolutionary principles of "descent, with modiComplicating matters, Farris (1983) pointed out that fication."
while "descent, with modification," may be required Taking my cue from Popper (1957) , I too will assume in the inference of synapomorphy as homoplasy, those Darwin's principles of "descent, with modification," assumptions are not sufficient to explain synapomoras the necessary explaining theories (L) in a deductive phy as homology-an additional assumption(s) being historical model of explanation, with cladogram, and required ( Fig. 1 ). Further, in defining phylogenetic parits common ancestral relations, constituting the specific simony in terms of the "minimization of requirements initial condition (C ) and synapomorphy the specific for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy," Farris was simevent to be explained (E ). Summarizing:
ply following a well-known tenet of Popper's (e.g., 1983 ) philosophy of science-avoid all assumptions, L, descent, with modification except those required as background knowledge.
C, cladogram
Farris' (1983) emphasis on homoplasy in the inferexplanation ence of phylogeny also followed Popper. Consider that E, synapomorphy.
the logical form of the conditional of cladogram/homology is modus ponens, if p then q/p/therefore q, Defining the concept of homology as "features (parts, attributes) that were present in the common ancestor in which they are homologous" (Ghiselin, 1984), we are led to an inheritance model of explanation: L, descent, with modification C, cladogram explanation of inheritance E, synapomorphy as homology.
This definition of homology in terms of cladogram is not circular, because phylogeny is not defined in terms of homology (Ghiselin, 1966) . Although this it contains no reference to operationalisms, such as the interpreted as homologous-the shared-derived states whereas cladogram/homoplasy is the contrapositive hypothesis, in light of the background knowledge. Put even more simply, testability is a measure of how much conditional, modus tollens, if p then q/not-q/therefore not-p. Modus ponens is an invalid form of deductive the hypothesis increases the likelihood of the evidence. Also noteworthy, regarding minimizing assumptions, inference, assuming just "descent, with modification," because the premises (L and C ) do not preclude the the hypothesis receives a higher degree of corroboration the smaller the p(e,b) and in particular when "if not-p, then q" argument. To affirm the consequent (q) does not necessarily establish p. The two possible p(e,b) 1/2. If the evidence would seem to follow from background knowledge alone, then the hypothedeductive historical models for explaining synapomorphy may then be stated as: sis contributes little, and degree of corroboration is low. the degree to which it can avoid postulating homoplasies," and from which he derived the phylogenetic Independent origins model of "explanation" (modus parsimony criterion, "the minimization of requiretollens: if p then q/not-q/therefore not-p):
ments for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy." When exercising this criterion, synapomorphies hypothe-L, descent, with modification sized as homologies are maximized on the cladogram C, cladogram that exhibits the fewest number of hypothesized evoluexplanation of independent origins tionary "modifications" (transformations, steps). Ac-E, synapomorphy as homoplasy.
cording to Carpenter et al. (1998: 106) , this connection between parsimony and explanation in testability was anticipated by Popper (1959: 401) , who stated that Popperian testability provides a basis for underIn explicating Popperian testability and Farris' argustanding the concept of test as one of falsification. Testment for explanatory power in phylogenetic systematability involves the logical relationships between severics, I have taken as standard practice the simultaneous ity of test, S(e,h,b), and degree of corroboration, analysis of a matrix of synapomorphies (see also Kluge, C(h,e,b), 1997a), where the matrix constitutes an array of evidence (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , . . . e n ), and the number of terminal taxa S(e, h, b) ϭ C (h, e, b) ϭ ( p (e, hb) Ϫ p(e, b) )/ . . . , on which the synapomorphies are scored determine the set of possible cladograms, an array of competing where e is evidence, h is hypothesis, and b is backhypotheses (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , . . . h n ). Also, I assume "descent, ground knowledge. 6 The significant numerator in Popwith modification," as necessary background knowlper's expression of testability is the difference between edge (b). Thus, for example, in the simple case of three the evidence with, p (e,hb), and without, p(e,b) , the terminal taxa, A, B, and C, there are three possible rooted cladograms: h 1 , (A,B)C; h 2 , (A,C)B; and h 3 , 6 p in this context denotes propensity, a physical interpretation of (B,C)A. Further, given just the assumptions of "descent, the possibilities; p does not pertain to precise probabilities, such as with modification," (b), synapomorphies (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , . . . frequencies, which are abstractions (Popper, 1983: 286) . The logical e n ) characteristic of the competing cladograms (h 1 , h 2 , development of Popper's severity of test and degree of corroboration has been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Kluge, 1997a if a large majority of one of those possible classes of synapomorphy, homoplasy, constitutes falsifying evidence (e), and explanatory power is necessarily maxsynapomorphies were to be discovered, for the sake of argument assume it is the class which characterizes imized in choosing the least falsified cladogram, because the congruent synapomorphies must be h 1 , then this finding is unlikely given the background knowledge alone, but not under the background knowlexplained as having common ancestral origins (i.e., homologies). There seems to be no escape from this edge plus the postulated cladogram ((A,B)C). Therefore, h 1 is the most highly corroborated, most severely conclusion given just "descent, with modification," and employing the parsimony criterion of minimizing tested of the three competing cladograms-C(h 1 ,e,b) Ͼ C(h 2 ,e,b) or C(h 3 ,e,b), assuming only "descent, with ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy, which may be delimited according to the test of congruence. modification." Further, in choosing the least falsified 7 cladogram-according to Farris' phylogenetic parsiHowever, if homoplasy is defined as independent origins, how can homoplasy be explained? Homoplasy mony criterion, minimizing requirements for ad hoc propositions of homoplasy-h 1 is maximally explanacannot be explained in terms of "descent, with modification," because homoplasious states, by definition, tory, more synapomorphies being interpretable as homologues on h 1 than on h 2 or h 3 . This simple example constitute a spatio-temporally, historically unconnected, set of things. Although not to be confused with also exposes the unnecessary nature of model assumptions in phylogenetic inference-the background causal explanation, a possible explanation for homoplasy is simply one of "error," systematic and/or samknowledge of descent, with modification, being sufficient to make a rationally justified and meaningful pling. Further, as Popper (1972: 359) argued, if progress in science consists of trials "in the elimination of erexplanation of homology of uniquely evolved historical generalizations.
POPPERIAN TESTABILITY
rors," then ways must be found to test synapomorphies as homoplasy, for otherwise phylogenetic systematics would not be progressive. Fitzhugh's (1998: 35) position can now be stated more If we can only adduce homoplasy as evidence countprecisely-if the causal condition of cladogram (C ) ing against cladograms, and homology as coincidenleads to an explanation of the current known effects tally explained on the least disconfirmed hypotheses of synapomorphy (E ), then synapomorphy (e) cannot of sister-group relationships, we may feel that our exbe used as an independent test of competing cladoplanation is circular and therefore quite unsatisfactory grams (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , . . . h n ). Although Fitzhugh stated the (Popper, 1972: 351) . However, there remains the possiproblem as if it were a fallacy of epistemological nonbility of testing cladograms, and synapomorphies idenindependence, it is my contention that the reasoning tified as homoplasies, according to prediction. Popper is not logically erroneous (see also Hull, 1967) . Rather, (1957: 124) clarifies such possibilities: the apparent problem is simply a consequence of de-". . . the use of a theory for predicting some specific event is just fining the possible effects of synapomorphy as a comanother aspect of its use for explaining such an event. And since we test a theory by comparing the events predicted with those plement relation-that synapomorphy which is not actually observed, our analysis also shows how theories can due to a common ancestral origin (homology) must be be tested. Whether we use a theory for the purpose of explanaof independent origin (homoplasy). An incongruent tion, of prediction, or of testing, depends upon our interest; it depends upon the question which statements we consider as given or unproblematic, and which statements we consider to 7 As with all singular descriptive generalizations, phylogenetic sysstand in need of further criticism, and of testing." tematics can have only modest pretensions when it comes to falsification. For example, evidence in the form of synapomorphy can Popper's (1957: 134) favorable reference to a systemonly constitute a weak form of falsification, because a synapomorphy atic botany study (Frankel, 1941) illustrates how he test statement can only "count against" a cladogram, unlike a univerbelieved observations guided by theory can lead to sal descriptive generalization being falsified by any one test (Hull, 1983; Sober, 1983: 339; contra Felsenstein, 1988: 529-530). further tests. I have argued elsewhere (Kluge, 1997b) 
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